



Closing blind spots & security gaps in your critical infrastructure and production networks

Klaus Eberhardt
Nozomi Networks

klaus.eberhardt@nozominetworks.com

BBC NEWS

Technology

Stuxnet 'hit' Iran nuclear plans

© 22 November 2010 Technology

The Stuxnet worm might be partly responsible for delays in Iran's nuclear programme, says a former UN nuclear inspections official.

Olli Heinonen, deputy director at the UN's nuclear watchdog until August, said the virus might be behind Iran's problems with uranium enrichment.

Discovered in June, Stuxnet is the first worm to target control systems found in industrial plants.

Iran has denied that delays to its nuclear plans were caused by Stuxnet.



SPIEGEL ONLINE INTERNATIONAL

Front Page World Europe Germany Business Zeitgeist BeyondTomorrow Newsletter

English Site > World > Cyber Threats > Mossad's Miracle Weapon: Stuxnet Virus Opens New Era of Cyber War

Mossad's Miracle Weapon: Stuxnet Virus Opens New Era of Cyber War

By Holger Stark

The Mossad, Israel's foreign intelligence agency, attacked the Iranian nuclear program with a highly sophisticated computer virus called Stuxnet. The first digital weapon of geopolitical importance, it could change the way wars are fought -- and it will not be the last attack of its kind.

August 08, 2011 - 03:04 PM

Print Feedback Comment

Share Twitter Email

The complex on a hill near an interchange on the highway from Tel Aviv to Haifa is known in Israel simply as "The Hill." The site, as big as several soccer fields, is sealed off from the outside world with high walls and barbed wire -- a modern fortress that symbolizes Israel's fight for survival in the Middle East. As the headquarters of Israel's foreign intelligence agency, the Mossad, this fortress is strictly off-limits to politicians and journalists alike. Ordinarily, it is the Mossad that makes house calls, and not the other way around.

From the Magazine

NEWS | July 5, 2021

Coop Sweden stores close temporarily due to ransomware attack

Customers can continue shopping on coop.se, via the retailer's mobile app and at stores linked to its Scan and Pay mobile solution.

RansomEXX claims ransomware attack on Sea-Doo, Ski-Doo maker

By Bill Toulas

August 24, 2022 12:36 PM



The RansomEXX ransomware gang is claiming responsibility for the cyberattack against Bombardier Recreational Products (BRP), disclosed by the company on August 8, 2022.

At the time, the Canadian maker of Ski-Doo snowmobiles, Sea-Doo jet skis, ATVs, motorcycles, watercrafts, and Rotax engines informed the public of a temporary stop for all operations as a response to "malicious cyberactivity."

Industroyer: A cyber-weapon that brought down a power grid

by André Lameiras • June 20, 2022

Five years ago, ESET researchers released their analysis of the first ever malware that was designed specifically to attack power grids

Maersk Line: Surviving from a cyber attack

by The Editorial Team • May 31, 2018 in Cyber Security



In June 2017, A.P. Moller – Maersk fell victim to a major cyber-attack caused by the NotPetya malware, which also affected many organisations globally. As a result, Maersk's operations in transport and logistics businesses were disrupted, leading to unwarranted impact.



RECOMMENDED

July 22, 2022 02:53 AM

Eberspaecher reveals details of cyberattack that likely cost up to \$60M

The supplier, which produces exhaust technology, air conditioning and heating systems, shut down networks and servers when cyber criminals used ransomware to gain access to its IT systems.

| All rights reserved. | www.nozominetworks.com




Photographer: Samuel Corum/Bloomberg

Cybersecurity

Hackers Breached Colonial Pipeline Using Compromised Password

By William Turton and Kartikay Mehrotra
4. Juni 2021, 21:58 MESZ

Notable cyber events in the second half of 2022



Multiple threat actors/sources

- **Adversarial**

- Outside Individual
- Inside Individual
- Trusted Insider
- Privileged insider
- Ad hoc group
- Established group
- Competitor
- Supplier
- Partner
- Customer
- Nation State

- **Accidental**


- User/Privileged user/Administrator

- **Structural**

- IT equipment
- Environmental controls
- Software

- **Environmental**

- Natural disaster
- Man-made disaster
- Infrastructure failure (e.g. telecommunications, electrical power)



Industrial Cyber Threats Vary in Sophistication

Source: <https://www.arcweb.com/industry-best-practices/what-industrial-cybersecurity-planning-maturity-model>

OT Is Everywhere

Transportation Fleet Management

Lower costs and reduce maintenance disruptions by monitoring fuel efficiency and engine performance; Improve safety record by monitoring driver behavior.




Airport

Improve passenger experience by monitoring security queue and baggage handling; Reduce operational costs by optimizing fleet, power grid and building management.

Agriculture

Increase productivity by measuring ground humidity, precipitation, and amount of sunlight.



Building Automation Management

Reduce costs by optimizing energy consumption and maintenance operations.


Pharma

Reduce manufacturing disruptions by monitoring production and distribution supply chain.



Maritime/Ports

Improve flow of containers by monitoring location of vehicles and goods, status of cargo, local terminal parking and traffic congestion.



Energy

Reduce disruptions by monitoring every stage in transmission and consumption of electricity, from substation to individual meter.

Oil & Gas

Reduce unplanned disruptions through improved monitoring of pumps and pipelines.



Mining

Improve the accuracy of ore data during drilling to increase production efficiency; Automate fleet operations with driverless trucks to haul ore.



Manufacturing

Reduce downtime by monitoring raw material supply chains; Reduce maintenance-related disruptions by measuring equipment performance in production processes.

IT vs. OT – Commonalities and Differences

IT

- Security – Protection from Cyber Threats
- Availability: 99.8%
- Hardware-Lifetime: ~ 5 years
- Regular system patches
- Loss of information – TCP is taking over
- Anti-Virus protection + EDR
- Encrypted connections
- Password-complexity + MFA
- Active monitoring
- Central visibility

OT

- Safety – Protection of life and limb
- “No disruption, never down”
- Lifetime of production assets: > 20 years
- Windows XP Systems
- Realtime protocols
- Closed systems from Vendors
- Cleartext protocols
- Simple access to systems (Safety!)
- Monitoring capabilities limited
- “Sneaker-Work”

OT Systems Evolution



Industry 4.0, Digital Transformation, IOT, 5G, NIS2, Compliance,...



Fully Air-Gapped
OT System

OT System
Partially Connected
to Each Other

“Retrofitted”
Cyber-Physical
System Through
IT/OT Convergence

Newly Designed/
Engineered
Cyber-Physical
System



More Isolation

More Connectivity



Examples of Traditional OT Systems

- Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
- Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
- Programmable Logic Control (PLC)
- Process Control Networks (PCN) – Including Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS), Engineer Workstation and Human Machine Interface (HMI)
- Distributed Control Systems (DCS)
- Computer Numerical Control (CNC)

Examples of OT-Related Cyber-Physical Systems

- Industrial Robots
- Virtual Reality Manufacturing Simulation Systems
- Self-Optimizing Press-Bending and Roll-Forming Machine
- Adaptable Production Systems
- Energy-Efficient Intralogistics Systems
- Connected 3D Printers
- Smart Grids
- IIoT

Digitalization...not without cybersecurity

14 sec

a ransomware
attack occurs

5 min

the average time it takes for an
IoT device to be attacked after
going online

3.8

Mio USD – average cost of a
breach

67%

is the increase in security
breaches over last year

70%

of the employees don't
understand cybersecurity

50 days

typically pass between breach
discovery and reporting dates


Challenges

- Responsibility
- Speak the same language
- Limited resources
- Pressure from the Business
 - Digital transformation
 - IOT / 5G
 - Regulatory compliance

We need transparency


- “We can’t protect what we cannot see”
- Setting the baseline
 - How does my landscape look like?
 - Which assets are communicating?
 - How do they communicate?
 - Are there any anomalies in this communication?
 - How is my process configured?

Goal: Network visualization - Transparency!




Pain Point: Network visualization and monitoring

Go deep in details ...



Nodes



Variables

#1 – Asset Discovery

GUARDIAN LIVE HOST vantage-guardian01 22.21-05192256_83809 TIME 15:36:25.832 DISK 863M used / 3.8G free LICENSEE Nozomi Networks... UPDATES TI AI English

NOZOMI NETWORKS Dashboard | Appliances | Alerts | Environment | Analysis | Smart Polling Administration admin

Asset view List Diagram

Page 3 of 11,266 entries Export Confirmed MACs only Live 13 selected

ACTIONS	NAME	TYPE	OS/FIRMWARE	IP	VENDOR	PRODUCT NAME	SERIAL NUMB...	MAC ADDRESS	MAC VENDOR	
<input type="checkbox"/>	AC 800M PM851	PLC	Firmware: 5.1100.13)	192.168.19.156	ABB	AC 800M PM851				prod
<input type="checkbox"/>	CP8811	voip_phone	Firmware: 10.3.1	10.32.110.50	Cisco	CP8811		70:d3:79:20:6e:32	Cisco Systems, Inc	othe
<input type="checkbox"/>	AC 800M PM851	PLC	Firmware: 5.1100.13)	192.168.111.202	ABB	AC 800M PM851				prod
<input type="checkbox"/>	AC 800M PM851	PLC	Firmware: 5.1100.13)	192.168.113.202	ABB	AC 800M PM851				prod
<input type="checkbox"/>	AC 800M PM851	PLC	Firmware: 5.1100.13)	192.168.172.140	ABB	AC 800M PM851				prod
<input type="checkbox"/>	plc095.ACME0.corporationnet.com	PLC	Firmware: 5.1100.13)	192.168.114.76	ABB	AC 800M PM851		00:00:23:a8:72:4c	ABB INDUSTRIAL SYSTEMS AB	prod
<input type="checkbox"/>	plc14.ACME0.corporationnet.com	PLC	Firmware: 5.1100.13)	192.168.113.12	ABB	AC 800M PM851		00:00:23:a8:71:0c	ABB INDUSTRIAL SYSTEMS AB	prod
<input type="checkbox"/>	CP8811	voip_phone	Firmware: 10.3.1	10.32.110.62	Cisco	CP8811		70:d3:79:20:6e:3e	Cisco Systems, Inc	othe
<input type="checkbox"/>	10.0.42.221	-		10.0.42.221						cons
<input type="checkbox"/>	plc082.ACME0.corporationnet.com	OT_device		192.168.111.141	ABB INDUSTRIAL SYSTEMS AB			00:00:23:a8:6f:8d	ABB INDUSTRIAL SYSTEMS AB	prod
<input type="checkbox"/>	CP8811	voip_phone	Firmware: 10.3.1	10.34.12.54	Cisco	CP8811		00:08:e3:22:0c:36	Cisco Systems, Inc	othe
<input type="checkbox"/>	plc096.ACME0.corporationnet.com	OT_device		192.168.16.205	ABB INDUSTRIAL SYSTEMS AB			00:00:23:a8:10:cd	ABB INDUSTRIAL SYSTEMS AB	prod
<input type="checkbox"/>	AC 800M PM851	PLC	Firmware: 5.1100.13)	192.168.18.204	ABB	AC 800M PM851				prod
<input type="checkbox"/>	plc093.ACME0.corporationnet.com	OT_device		192.168.107.251	ABB INDUSTRIAL SYSTEMS AB			00:00:23:a8:6b:fb	ABB INDUSTRIAL SYSTEMS AB	prod
<input type="checkbox"/>	CP8811	voip_phone	Firmware: 10.3.1	10.32.110.52	Cisco	CP8811		70:d3:79:20:6e:34	Cisco Systems, Inc	othe
<input type="checkbox"/>	CP8811	voip_phone	Firmware: 10.3.1	10.32.110.61	Cisco	CP8811		70:d3:79:20:6e:3d	Cisco Systems, Inc	othe
<input type="checkbox"/>	plc178.ACME0.corporationnet.com	PLC	Firmware: v2.9	[multiple]	Schneider Electric	Modicon M340 BMX P34 20;		00:60:78:00:90:57	POWER MEASUREMENT LTD.	prod
<input type="checkbox"/>	plc171.ACME0.corporationnet.com	PLC	Firmware: v2.9	[multiple]	Schneider Electric	Modicon M340 BMX P34 20;		00:60:78:03:0e:8e	POWER MEASUREMENT LTD.	prod
<input type="checkbox"/>	ControlLogix 1756-ENBT/A	PLC	Firmware: 18.002		Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley	ControlLogix 1756-ENBT/A	00112231			othe
<input type="checkbox"/>	CP8811	voip_phone	Firmware: 10.3.1	10.34.12.43	Cisco	CP8811		00:08:e3:22:0c:2b	Cisco Systems, Inc	othe

#2 – Asset Details

plc178.ACME0.corporationnet.com

IP (2): 172.16.0.150, 172.16.1.150
 Roles: producer
 Product name: Modicon M340 BMX P34 2020
 Type: PLC

MAC address: 00:60:78:00:90:57
 MAC vendor: POWER MEASUREMENT LTD.
 Vendor: Schneider Electric
 Firmware version: v2.9

Overview | Sessions: 6 active | Alerts: 0 high · 0 med. | Software: 0 installed | Hotfixes: 0 installed | Patches: 0 missing | Vulnerabilities: 10 high · 114 med. | Variables: 4 entries

Focus on 172.16.0.150

	Received	Sent	Retransmission	Links
2.3 MB	1.3 MB	9.120%	1	
First seen	13:46			
Last seen	15:31	94.2 KB in last 30'	active	

Zone	Subnet	VLAN
Production_A	-	-

Modbus/firmware version	2.9
Modbus/product name	Modicon m340
Modbus/vendor	Schneider-electric
Modicon/hardware id	0601-0301

Protocol	Last activity	Inbound	Outbound
modbus	15:31	-	-
		active sessions	active sessions

Node is	Asset intelligence
fully learned	enriched asset

CPU	RAM	Disk

Security (Updated on: 2022-06-08)

Vulnerabilities: 114 (10 high)

Antivirus: -

Hardware components

- slot: Slot-00
 - component: 6.30.1.3
 - product_name: BMXP342020
 - component_type: Processor module
 - vendor: Schneider Electric
 - version: 2.90
- slot: Slot-01
 - component: 6.0.2.10
 - product_name: BMXDRA 0805
 - component_type: Discrete output module
 - vendor: Schneider Electric
 - version: 2.0

#3 – Vulnerability Information

 **plc177.ACME0.corporationnet.com**



IP: 172.16.0.142
 Roles: **producer**
 Product name: **i** Modicon M340 BMX P34 2020
 Type: **i** Controller

MAC address: 00:60:78:01:99:d5
 MAC vendor: POWER MEASUREMENT LTD.
 Vendor: **i** Schneider Electric
 Firmware version: **i** v2.9

Overview Sessions (0 active) Alerts (0 high · 0 med.) Software (0 installed) **Vulnerabilities (18 high · 55 med.)** Variables (2 entries)

Page 1 of 3, 73 entries

Export  Only unresolved Live   12 selected 

ACTIONS	CVE	NODE	SCORE	CWE	CWE NAME	CVE CREATION DATE	DISCOVERY DAT
<input type="checkbox"/> 	NN-2018-0002	172.16.0.142	 7.5	754	Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions	2020-01-07 00:15:00.000	09:32:45.296
<input type="checkbox"/> 	NN-2017-0005	172.16.0.142	 7.5	400	Uncontrolled Resource Consumption	2017-06-30 05:29:00.000	09:32:45.295
<input type="checkbox"/> 	CVE-2022-37300	172.16.0.142	 9.8	640	Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password	2022-09-12 20:15:00.000	09:32:45.294
<input type="checkbox"/> 	CVE-2022-22724	172.16.0.142	 7.5	400	Uncontrolled Resource Consumption	2022-02-05 00:15:00.000	09:32:45.290
<input type="checkbox"/> 	CVE-2021-22792	172.16.0.142	 7.5	476	NULL Pointer Dereference	2021-09-02 19:15:00.000	09:32:45.289
<input type="checkbox"/> 	CVE-2021-22791	172.16.0.142	 6.5	787	Out-of-bounds Write	2021-09-02 19:15:00.000	09:32:45.288
<input type="checkbox"/> 	CVE-2021-22790	172.16.0.142	 6.5	125	Out-of-bounds Read	2021-09-02 19:15:00.000	09:32:45.287
<input type="checkbox"/> 	CVE-2021-22789	172.16.0.142	 6.5	119	Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer	2021-09-02 19:15:00.000	09:32:45.287
<input type="checkbox"/> 	CVE-2021-22788	172.16.0.142	 7.5	787	Out-of-bounds Write	2022-02-11 19:15:00.000	09:32:45.279
<input type="checkbox"/> 	CVE-2021-	172.16.0.142	 7.5	787	Out-of-bounds Write	2022-02-11 19:15:00.000	09:32:45.279

#4 – Anomaly Detection

A "new node" is identified

Incident **Threat Dragonfly2 found [Dragonfly2]** [8927ef33-9fd4--48d5-9392-f39b45ca3fe5]

Status: **open**

Created at: **14:45:21.417** (an hour ago)

Last update: **14:46:32.085** (an hour ago)

Details on **INCIDENTNEW-NODE**

A new unseen node has started to send packets in the network.

Incident details

A malicious malware transfer is detected

- New node 172.16.0.55 appeared on the network
- A suspicious packet was sent [sid:41978] -- Microsoft Windows SMB remote code execution attempt. Activity was detected related to an exploit at the SMB protocol - Eternal Blue. The SMBv1 server in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, and Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607, and Windows Server 2016 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted packets.
- A suspicious packet was sent [sid:42000006] -- SMB Server-Traffic contains NTLM-Authenticated SMBv1 Session. Activity was detected related to NTLM-Authenticated SMBv1 Session, that indicates attempts to abuse the exploits in SMBv1.
- Suspicious transferring of malware named 'TemplateAttack_DragonFly_2_0' (MDS: 722154a36f32ba10e98020a8ad758a7a) was detected involving resource '\\172.16.0.55\ADMIN\CVcontrolEngineer.docx' after a 'read' operation

Details (at the alert time)

Note:

Source: 172.16.0.55 - 00:0c:29:28:dd:c5 - Production_A

Alerts

Page 1 of 2,900 alerts

Show all alerts Export Live Count by field... 11 selected


...	RISK	TIME	ID	TYPE ID	DESCRIPTION	PROTOCOL	IP SRC	IP DST	SRC PORT	DST PORT
<input type="checkbox"/>	4.5	14:46:32.085	19f6a302	SIGN-MALWARE-DETECTED	Suspicious transferring of malware named ...	smb	172.16.0.253	172.16.0.55	1148	445
<input type="checkbox"/>	2.5	14:46:31.969	fa778bef	VINEW-LINK	New link with protocol smb between 172.16...	smb	172.16.0.253	172.16.0.55	1148	445
<input type="checkbox"/>	7.5	14:46:31.866	7a2a76ab	VINEW-PROTOCOLAPPLICATION	Protocol tcp/445 between 172.16.0.253 and 1...	smb	172.16.0.253	172.16.0.55	1148	445
<input type="checkbox"/>	6	14:46:31.866	d6b45749	SIGNPACKET-RULE	A suspicious packet was sent [sid:4200000...	smb	172.16.0.253	172.16.0.55	1148	445
<input type="checkbox"/>	7.5	14:46:31.856	772fde02	VINEW-LINK	New link with protocol tcp/445 between 17...	tcp/445	172.16.0.253	172.16.0.55	1148	445

Single alert details

A new communication is detected


Pain Point: Network visualization and monitoring

... find connection attempts to public internet ...



Pain Point: Network visualization and monitoring

... look back into the past



Result after we have achieved transparency

- Complete Asset Inventory (-> Integration into CMDB?)
- Cyber Threat Protection in realtime
- Integrations with existing systems, automated remediation
 - E. g. Firewall- or SIEM systems
- Vulnerability Management



Global Leadership Footprint



Global Customer Base
11K+ Installations




102M Devices Monitored
Across Converged OT/IoT



Scalable Deployments
Across **6 Continents**



Global Expertise
Worldwide Network of Partners and
1,800+ Certified Professionals



Securing the World's Largest Organizations



9 of Top 20
Oil & Gas



7 of Top 10
Pharma



5 of Top 10
Mining



5 of Top 10
Utilities



Chemicals



Manufacturing



Automotive



Airports



Water



Building Automation



Food & Retail



Logistics



Smart Cities



Transportation

Nozomi Networks Solution Portfolio

MANAGEMENT OPTIONS



VANTAGE

- SaaS
- FIPS-compliant



CENTRAL MANAGEMENT CONSOLE

- On-Premises
- FIPS-compliant

SENSORS



GUARDIAN

- ANSSI-certified
- FIPS-compliant



GUARDIAN AIR



ARC SENSOR

- Windows
- Apple
- Linux



REMOTE COLLECTOR

ENHANCED CAPABILITIES



VANTAGE IQ



SMART POLLING



THREAT INTELLIGENCE



ASSET INTELLIGENCE

SERVICE OFFERINGS

**Certified
Engineer Training**

**Professional
Services**

**Customer
Support**

**OnePass/
HWaaS**

Nozomi Networks Strengths



Proven Scalability

Central Management & Analysis

Manage any number of sites & assets

Cloud Multi-tier Architecture

SaaS platform monitors any number of assets and locations from anywhere

Agentless Protection

Single Guardian sensor can monitor over 500K assets



Faster Deployment

Sensor Options to Fit Your Environment

Physical, virtual, cloud, edge, container sensors

Cloud Architecture

SaaS platform speeds onboarding, eliminates sizing issues

Industry's Largest Partner Ecosystem and Open API

Minimizes integration complexity



Always-On Monitoring

Continuous Monitoring of All Supported Protocols:

OT, IoT and IT
No critical blind spots

Unmatched Detection & Visibility

Prevents operational disruptions

Audit-ready Default Configuration

Avoids findings due to misconfiguration



Full Stack Solution

No Reliance on Other Vendors

Avoids EOL impacts or waiting for patches

Rigorous QA Ensures Interoperability and Stability

Improves hardening, scalability, rollback, data analysis

Integrated Development

Extracts the best performance from hardware and software

Successful customers: Gartner Peer Insights



ROLE: RAIL OT CYBERSECURITY
INDUSTRY: TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY SIZE: 10B – 30B USD

Great Ride for a Major Rail Operator

Nozomi supported us from the beginning of our initiative for improving the visibility of the network activity on our Critical OT Infrastructure. Their solution has been chosen after a long process, including evaluation of multiple options over a long period of time. The sales, presales and delivery team were a big part of the reason why we chose Nozomi in addition to the technology itself. We are currently rolling out the technology over a large rail network, and before we took the decision we made a thorough Proof of Concept/Value process.



ROLE: INFRASTRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS
INDUSTRY: ENERGY PRODUCTION
COMPANY SIZE: 1B – 3B USD

Nozomi Is Very Easy to Use and Its Information Can Be Integrated Easily Into SIEMs

We use Nozomi for analysis of our OT network and we appreciate a lot feedback from system and the fact that is very powerful system.



ROLE: SECURITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT
INDUSTRY: PROVIDER
COMPANY SIZE: 250M – 500M USD

A CISO Must Have for OT Environment

Nozomi Networks is the leader in this field. It's not just a security technology, it's simple a eye wide open into the darkness world of the Operation Technology. For me as Security Manager it's really a must have!!

[More Reviews](#) from Nozomi Networks Customers



Thank You!

Nozomi Networks accelerates digital transformation by protecting the world's critical infrastructure, industrial and government organizations from cyber threats. Our solution delivers exceptional network and asset visibility, threat detection, and insights for OT and IoT environments. Customers rely on us to minimize risk and complexity while maximizing operational resilience.

PPT-TECH-SALES-020

nozominetworks.com